We document the effects of a change in the Italian Ordinary Unemployment Benefits Scheme on the job search process. As of January 2001, the replacement rate was raised from 30% to 40% and benefits' duration extended from 6 to 9 months for workers aged 50 or more. Our results show that (a) the average duration of benefits' collection increased by around one month for individuals entitled to 3 additional months, while it did not change significantly for those only exposed to higher replacement rates; (b) the pace of reemployment is never found to be statistically different across regimes, although point estimates for those exposed to a longer duration consistently indicate a 2 to 4 percentage points lower probability of re-employment at several horizons. Graphical evidence suggests that job-separation rates did not change with the new regime, while take-up apparently did, although the clear cyclical pattern could bias the picture. We conclude that, if any, the behavioural response induced by the change, must have been modest in economic terms. We discuss the reasons why the response may have been so subdued.
The elasticity of unemployment duration to unemployment benefits is a key ingredient in the design of optimal unemployment schemes (Baily (1978) , Chetty (2006) , Chetty (2008) ).
The primary goal of unemployment insurance (UI) is to reduce the welfare costs caused by job loss, workers reallocation and people flows in and out of the labor market. It achieves this goal by providing insurance to job losers. Importantly, such insurance provision also generates disincentives to work as it alters the relative prices of consumption and leisure. This means that the estimated elasticity of unemployment duration to unemployment benefits is a mixture of two effects: a socially suboptimal "substitution" effect, triggered by the distortion to relative prices, and a socially optimal "liquidity" effect, caused by the availability of cash that fixes financial markets failures and eases the pressure on liquidity constrained beneficiaries to find quickly a new job. Both effects imply that more generous benefits schemes increase unemployment duration and such positive association has been widely documented (for example, the reviews in Atkinson and Micklewright (1990) and Krueger and Meyer (2002) ). However, Chetty (2008) shows that in the US a large portion of the response of search behavior to unemployment benefits can be traced to the liquidity effect rather than to the moral hazard effect induced by 1 The views expressed here are our own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy. We thank Federico Cingano, Francesco D'Amuri, Francesca Lotti, and Roberto Torrini for their comments. We also received useful comments from seminar participants at the Bank of Italy and Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze. Email: alfonso.rosolia@bancaditalia.it, paolo.sestito@bancaditalia.it 5 UI. This paper documents the effects of replacement rates and benefits duration on the job search process in Italy. Specifically, it only attempts to quantify the overall elasticity without addressing the issue of its determinants and, as a consequence, its (sub) optimality. We pursue our goal exploiting a change in the Italian ordinary unemployment benefits scheme, the major scheme providing unemployment insurance, that raised replacement rates from 30 to 40 and duration from 6 to 9 months for eligibles older than 50. We focus on the effects of such change on the length of time on benefits, on separation rates, and on the duration of job-to-job transitions exploiting a variety of empirical strategies. To our knowledge this is the first paper that looks into the relationship between unemployment insurance and duration in Italy.
We find that time spent on benefits increases by about one month for those entitled to a longer duration, while no effect can be detected for those only entitled to the higher replacement rate.
When we explore the behavioral responses of such changes, we only find mild and generally non robust effects on re-employment probabilities. This result has to be interpreted with caution, however. On the one hand, our data do not allow to control for important determinants of search behavior such as asset holdings, marital status and other relevant socio-demographics, or the availability of other welfare schemes at benefits expiration. On the other, our sample covers only a couple of years after the specific change we examine was implemented raising the possibility that it was not entirely perceived and exploited by potential beneficiaries. Finally, the limited variation in the amount of resources provided by the change, especially as concerns the increase in replacement rates, together with the small sample size, yield very imprecise estimates that might lead us to overlook the behavioral responses of interest if these are not sufficiently strong.
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The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we briefly illustrate the main unemployment insurance schemes available in Italy. We then move to the data and describe its main features. Next, we present the empirical analysis. We then conclude.
Institutional setting
The Italian unemployment insurance system is highly fragmented into several schemes that are extremely heterogeneous as concerns eligibility criteria and benefits levels; relevant segments of the labor force are eligible only for residual schemes and large portions are not covered; the system is broadly unmonitored. These features makes it unsuitable to soften the private burden of job loss and to help smooth the social costs of workers re-allocation while preserving the correct private incentives to work.
The standard unemployment insurance scheme for Italian private non-agricultural employees is the Ordinary Unemployment Benefits (OUB) which constitutes the object of our investigation. Eligible individuals are private non-agricultural employees who either have been dismissed or whose temporary contract has expired, who have contributed to the scheme for at least 12 of the previous 24 months and are actively searching for a job. Of this set of criteria, the dismissal and the active search ones have never been seriously enforced. In principle, to claim benefits from the Social security institute (INPS) a dismissed worker should first register with the Public Employment Service (PES). However, the two institutions are only weakly connected and the PES itself does not really monitors the search behavior of individuals registered as unemployed 2 . Eventually, the only really relevant eligibility condition is having a sufficiently long employment span prior to unemployment. In 2006, about 360,000 beneficiaries relied on this scheme, with an average payment for each spell of about 3,000 Euro (Anastasia et al. (2008) ).
Figure (1) such increase in the replacement rate, potential benefit duration was also selectively extended from 6 to 9 months for workers aged 50 or more 4 . We provide an evaluation of the effects of these changes on unemployment duration, on benefits spell duration, and on job separation rates 5 .
3 Benefits are capped; in 2010 the cap was 892.96 euro if the unemployed monthly wage was not larger than 1931.86 euro and 1073.25 if above. In practice, in 2010 the average full time worker earned roughly 2300 euro per month so that the actual replacement rate for the average worker would fall short of 50 percent.
4 Currently, potential duration is 8 months for unemployed younger than 50 and 12 months for older ones. Replacement rates are set at 60 percent in the first 6 months, 50 percent for the 7th and 8th month and, for workers older than 50, 40 percent from the 9th to 12th months.
5 The two other largest unemployment benefits schemes are the Mobility Indemnity and the Reduced Unemployment Benefits. The Mobility Indemnity (MI) is accessible by those employees who have worked in industrial firms with at least 15 employees and have been involved in a collective dismissal procedure. MI benefits amount to 80% of the previous wage with a cap such that the average worker gets about 2/3 of his wage; the scheme lasts for a maximum of 12 months for workers below age 40, 24 months for those in between 40 and 50, and 36 months for unemployed older than 50; residence in the South earns an additional 12 months of duration. MI typically follows the expiration of Cassa Integrazione Guadagni, a scheme financing temporary layoffs at about 80% of the previous wage. In 2006 about 100,000 persons have claimed and obtained MI. The Reduced Unemployment Benefits (RUB) scheme is targeted to private non-agricultural employees not covered by either OUB or MI. It provides a lump sum payment in the calendar year following the one when the non-employment spell was experienced provided at least 3 month of employment were filed in that year. Beneficiaries are not required to be actively searching for a job nor to be effectively unemployed when cashing in the payment. In 2006 RUB was claimed by about 470,000 persons with an average payment of 1,400 Euro. All three schemes entitle the beneficiaries also to fictional pension contribution. This turns out to be especially relevant for RUB beneficiaries, who typically are seasonal workers.
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Empirical analysis
In this section we document whether and to what extent individual behaviors have been affected by the institutional change described above. The change tilted two relevant margins of UI: benefits' generosity and benefits' duration. Since potential duration only changed for job losers beyond age 50, appropriate comparisons allow to isolate the effects of the two margins on the outcomes of interest. Before turning to the empirical analyisis, we briefly illustrate the data sources and motivate the choice of the outcome variables studied in the paper.
Data and outcome variables
We use Social security records collected for a large representative sample of Italian private non- Second, because our focus is on the ordinary unemployment benefits scheme, we exclude from the sample the entire histories of individuals who are observed in self-employment, on some special benefits scheme, in early retirement and people collecting some kind of disability benefit.
Third, we assume that overlapping employment relationships represent a unique employment spell; a similar assumption is made for a few observations for whom we observe overlapping ordinary benefits collection spells. Fourth, we assume that subsequent employment spells with at most one week of non-employment represent direct job-to-job transitions The data allow to study two different outcome variables. More specifically, we observe with a high degree of precision the length of the spell over which benefits are collected (time on benefits, henceforth) and, subject to the above assumptions, a noisiy measure of the length of the spell between two subsequent employment relationships (non-employment spell, henceforth).
Needless to say, time on benefits is observed only for those who collect benefits. For them, time on benefits is a censored version of the actual duration of the non-employment spells, the censoring threshold being the potential duration of benefits. While from the behavioral point of view the relevant outcome is the length of a non-employment spell, studying the reaction of time on benefits to the institutional change allows to quantify the increased cost associated with the change borne by the Social Security administration. Moreover, because it provides a cleaner, althoug censored, measure of non-employment duration it provides a useful benchmark to compare the results obtained for the more relevant non-employment duration.
UI generosity and time on benefits
Figure (2) displays the distribution of weeks on benefits by year when the spell began; the top panel refers to persons aged 20-48 at job termination, exposed from 2001 only to a higher replacement rate; the bottom one to those 51 and older, for whom also potential duration was increased. Every year around 40% of spells reaches the expiration limit and the pattern turns out to be similar across age groups. Visual inspection suggests the proportion of spells expiring at the limit is highly cyclical. For the population aged 20-48, for whom the institutional change only implied an increase in the replacement rate, there is no clear pattern before and after the relevant date (2000) (2001) . On the other hand, the extension of benefits duration to 9 months for the population older than 50 clearly shifted the spike to the right and decreased it by a half.
To quantify the effects of the two changes in the unemployment scheme of time on benefits we resort to simple linear models of the type:
where d it is completed time on benefits of individual i for the spell beginning in year t, E it is a dummy for the exposure to the change, X it are individual and aggregate controls, ǫ it a residual.
We report results for θ obtained from a variety of specifications of the control set (X it ) and of the underlying time window. Because the outcome under analysis is time on benefits, the samples obviously only includes beneficiaries.
Longer potential duration
The extension of the potential duration of benefits from 6 to 9 months was age-specific and applied only to beneficiaries older than 50 when filing for benefits. This provides two main margins to assess its effects, age and time. Columns (1) to (7) in table (1) report estimates of θ from equation (1) in which E it = 1 if t = 2001 and age is equal or above 51 and zero otherwise.
Estimates thus include both the effect of the longer potential duration and that of the higher replacement rate. In columns (1) to (3) we only use persons aged 51-65, so that identification relies exclusively on comparisons over time of individuals of similar age. In column (1) we simply compare duration on benefits for beneficiaries in 2000 and in 2001 and find a significantly longer duration for the latter of about 32 days; the result is broadly confirmed when we add individual controls for residence, sex, age and characteristics of the previous job (col. 2). In column (3) we extend the sample to the period 1997-2001 and augment the control set with a cubic in time, quarterly unemployment and GDP growth rates to capture cyclical conditions. We find again a significantly longer benefit spell for beneficiaries entitled to the extendend limit of about one month. These exercises do not allow to take fully into account common differences between periods. Therefore, in columns (4) to (7) we also exploit the age margin to estimate the effect of interest. This allows to control for time effects under the assumption that these are common to persons of different ages. Perhaps more relevantly, conditional on the above assumption, this specification allows to quantify only the effects of a longer potential duration as both groups are exposed to a higher replacement rate 8 . Specifically, we compare time spent on benefits of people aged 51-55 to people aged 45-48 (cols. (4)- (6)) and of people aged 51-65 to 20-48 (col. (7)) 9 . In column (4) we only focus on spells begun in 2001, the first year benefits were extended, and simply compare time on benefits of people aged 45-48 to those of people aged 51-55. The results are remarkably consistent with those presented in the previous exercises:
we find a statistically significant longer duration on benefits of about 26 days for beneficiaries entitled also to the extended benefits. In column (5) we estimate equation (1) on the sample of 45-48 and 51-55 year old including also spells begun in 2000, the year prior to the change, and controlling for a sex-specific linear age term, year dummies and dummies for the initial week of the spell. While the precision is lower, because the control for age is highly collinear with the dummy for the treatment (that identifies persons older than 50 in 2001), we still obtain a 10 percent significance level and a stable point estimate of about 22 days. In columns (6) and (7) we extend the time window to the whole 1997-2001 period and, in column (7), the age span to include all persons aged 20-65, so at to weaken the correlation between age and the relevant dummy E it . We also augment the control set with characteristics of the previous job spell, dummies for area of residence, quarterly unemployment and GDP growth rates when the spell begun. In both cases, we find a significant increase of about 20-30 days, consistent with the earlier results based only on comparisons over time. Incidentally, the stability of the estimates across specifications that do and do not control for time-varying common unobserved determinants of time on benefits, suggests these to be of little relevance at the juncture under analyisis.
In columns (8) and (9) 13 a longer potential duration of benefits.
Higher replacement rate
The increase in the replacement rate affected all beneficiaries, independently of their age, starting from 2001. Comparing the point estimates in columns (1)- (3) with those reported in columns (4)- (7) of table (1) suggests that the increased replacement rate may have had some, perhaps tiny, effect. In fact, estimates in columns (1)- (3), that include both the effects of a longer duration and a higher replacement rate, appear to be consistently larger than those of subsequent columns (4)- (7) that in principle do not include the effects of a higher replacement rate. However, to get a more precise assessment of the higher replacement rate we estimate
(1) on the sample of individuals aged 20-48 at the beginning of their spell, only exposed to the higher replacement rate. The dummy for exposure to treatment thus equals unity for spells begun in 2001. Importantly, this exercise can only be based on comparisons over time of younger individuals. In column (1) of table (2) we estimate (1) with no controls on the sample of spells begun in 2000 and in 2001 11 . We find that duration on benefits is only about 5 days longer for spells beginning in the first semester of 2001 with respect to those begun one year earlier, but the estimate is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Furthermore, when in column (2) we control for area of residence, age, sex, a sex-specific linear age term, characteristics of the previous job spell, and a set of dummies for the initial week of the spell the point estimate becomes basically nil, with similar standard errors. Because identification of the effects of a higher replacement rate hinges on comparisons of persons in unemployment in different moments in time, estimates may reflect pre-trends or differences in cyclical conditions.
Thus, in column (3) we augment the control set with a cubic in calendar time and extend the sample to all spells begun in the first half of years 1997-2001; in column (4) we also include the quarterly unemployment rate and GDP growth in the inital quarter of the benefits spell.
In both cases, the effect remains small and statistically non significant. Finally, in column (5) we consider all spells except those begun in the second half of 2000, because they could be partially exposed to the regime change, and those begun in the second half of 2002, because of potential censoring. We find again no evidence of longer duration on benefits; beyond being not statistically different from zero, the point estimate turns out to be also economically small, about 8 days.
Overall, the results presented in this section suggest that after the change in the benefits scheme, average time on benefits increased primarily because of the extension granted to older beneficiaries, while there does not seem to be reliable evidence of longer duration traceable to the increase in the replacement rate.
UI generosity and non-employment
We now turn to the analysis of the duration of non-employment spells. As discussed above, from a behavioral point of view, this is the relevant variable as it reflects individual search effort. In this respect, the increase in the average length of time on benefits documented above does not necessarily imply longer non-employment spells or, alternatively, lower re-employment probabilities. The increase could reflect the higher expiration limit faced by older people so that a larger fraction of the non-employment spell is spent on benefits. Alternatively, absence of an effect on time on benefits among younger job losers could hide effects on exit rates not strong enough to significantly increase average time on benefits within the (unchanged) maximum 15 benefits window.
A first hint on the effects of the reform on the lenght of non-employment spells can be obtained from visual inspection of figure (3). We plot non-parametric estimates of the survival rate in non-employment by age-class and initial year of the spell both for UI beneficiaries and non beneficiaries. Among younger job losers, only affected by the higher replacement rate, beneficiaries in 2000 and 2001 do not display differnt patterns of re-employment, while among non-beneficiaries there appears to be some mild evidence of a slight slow down in reemployment patterns. Among older beneficiaries, also entitled to a longer benefits duration, reemployment is slower in 2001, with a lower proportion of reemployed individuals after 26 weeks of non-employment, corresponding to the pre-reform expiration limit; however, a slowdown of reemployment shows up also among older non beneficiaries.
A more precise assessment of the effects of the change in the benefits scheme on the probability of re-employment is reported in tables (3) and (4). We estimate a set of linear models for the probability of being again in employment at several horizons after job termination. Specifically, we estimate:
where e it is a dychotomous variable equal to unity if after a separation at time t, i is observed again in employment within the time window reported in the column headings; X it is a set of controls and E it is the exposure dummy 12 . Table ( In none of the exercise we detect significant differences in the probabilities of reemployment.
In the above exercises inference is based on comparisons of non-employment spells over time.
Therefore, we must assume that no aggregate shock is driving the (common) pattern of reemployment and possibly compensating the behavioral effects of a higher replacement rate. To address this issue in the bottom panel we include in the sample also non-beneficiaries. This allows to control explicitly for time effects under the assumption that these are common to beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. We thus replicate the exercises reported in the top panel with the addition of a full set of area-year dummies and a claimant dummy (C) capturing systematic differences between the two groups. Notice that benefits collectors display a systematically lower probability of reemployment at all horizons. The effect of the higher replacement rate on the probability of reemployment (E) turns out to be sizeable and significant only at longer horizons, beyond benefits expiration: after nine months, that is three months after expiration, benefit collectors exposed to a higher replacement rate are around 10 percentage points less likely to be back in employment than comparable collectors in earlier years. Moreover, the dif-ference appears to be too large: to put it in context, it amounts to half the systematic difference in reemployment probabilities between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries while the change in replacement rate was quite modest, from 30 to 40 percent. Moreover, it is hardly compatible with the lack of sizeable effects detected in the analyisis of time spent on benefits displayed in table (2).
Table (4) focuses on the effects of the longer potential duration. In this case, the exposure dummy E it = 1 if termination occurs in 2001 and age at termination is above 50. Because the change in benefits duration is age specific, the exposure dummy varies within year so that we can account for aggregate time effects while focussing on benefits beneficiaries only. Specifically, we focus on beneficiaries aged 40-48, not exposed to an increased duration, and those aged 51-60, from 2001 entitled to the longer benefits duration 13 . The first row reports the estimated effect of a longer duration on re-employment probabilities at the various horizons obtained from simple comparisons of re-employment patterns of benefits beneficiaries in 2001. We only detect some significant difference at longer durations. In the second row we control for log tenure, last wage and average wage at the previous job, area, initial week and sex dummies. We still find a significantly lower reemployment probability at longer horizons. However, identification of this effect relies heavily on the assumption that, absent the change, beneficiaries aged 40-48 and 51-60 would display the same re-employment patterns. This could fail if, for example, older non-employed have less incentives to search for a new job as retirement is closer. To address the role of this assumption in the third row we extend the sample to include also pre-2001 nonemployment spells. This allows to introduce an explicit control for age, which we let vary with sex 14 . Under this specification the point estimate of the effect of exposure to a longer potential duration shrinks considerably, in the range of 2-4 percentage points, becoming statistically non significant.
Potentially confounding effects of the increased generosity and potential duration
The institutional change under assessment involves an increase in benefits generosity common to all beneficiaries and a lenghtening of potential duration for job losers beyond age 50. Such changes are likely to affect not only the job search behavior of beneficiaries and thus their duration in non-employment, but also the behavior of previously non-beneficiaries. If such effects are in place, the increased generosity would generate a change in the pool of beneficiaries and thus potentially invalidate comparisons of relevant outcomes across UI regimes.
More generous benefits can induce some marginal job losers to start collecting benefits. In fact, those who actually collect benefits are a non-random subset of the non-employed. This can be clearly seen from figure (4) where we report predicted probabilities of collecting benefits by beneficiary status. Predicted probabilities are obtained with a probit model estimated for year 2000, before the change occurred, and considering sex, a cubic in age, dummies for the three main areas of residence and (log) last wage and tenure. Ideally, if beneficiary status were randomly assigned to the non-employed we would have observed two overlapping boxes; on the contrary, the figure clearly shows that beneficiaries are more likely to be such because of their observable characteristics 15 . Therefore, even absent changes in the pool of non-employed, if the new benefits scheme alters the pool of beneficiaries, comparisons of non-employment spells considerably the inference. On the contrary, a longer time dimension provides enough degrees of freedom to identify both coefficients. 15 Of course, observing the same predicted probability would only say that beneficiary status is independent of the set of regressors considered in the specific probit model. under different regimes would not provide valid inference on the effects of UI. This may occur, for example, if the relative utility of collecting benefits changes with the benefits scheme so that some otherwise non-claimant individuals may now find it preferable to cash in UI. Figure (5) plots the share of jobless collecting benefits by month-year of job loss for individuals aged 20-48, only affected by the increase in the replacement rate, and for those aged 51-65, also affected by the extension of benefits duration. We define takeup as an employment spell followed by a spell show that differences between the two groups of beneficiaries are not statistically significant so that, at least as concerns the available observable characterstics, beneficiaries before and after the change appear to be broadly comparable. This is largely confirmed from a second, slightly more elaborate, exercise. Specifically, we estimate a probit model for the probability that a beneficiary in years 2000-2001 is also exposed to treatment, which in our setting amounts to collecting benefits in year 2001, on a cubic in age, dummies for sex and area of residence, and log wage and tenure at last job. The models are estimated separately for beneficiaries only exposed to a higher replacement rate (age 20-48) and for those also exposed to a longer potential duration (51-65). Summing up, the above evidence suggests that, over the observation window and conditional on the limited available information on observable characteristics, the increased UI generosity did not cause significant changes along the observable characteristics in the composition of the pool of actual beneficiaries nor in the (larger) pool of job losers, thus justifying the comparisons discussed above.
Conclusion and further questions
In this paper we have documented how time on benefits and time to next job responded to a change in unemployment benefits scheme in Italy. The change implied an increase in replacement rate from 30 to 40% of the last wage and, exclusively for beneficiaries aged at least 50, an increase in the maximum duration of benefits from 6 to 9 months. The change was passed at the end of 2000 and phased in January 1st 2001.
We exploit a representative sample of administrative records that allows to recover the precise dates at which job relationships start and terminate, whether termination is followed by a spell on benefits and its duration. The data allow to recover wages and tenure of the workers along with a limited set of socio-demographic characteristics (sex, age, birthplace, residence);
importantly, we have no information on household composition, education and other important 22 determinants of the labor supply choice.
Not surprisingly, we find that recorded time on benefits increased for individuals entitled to the extended benefits duration. A set of exercises based on comparisons of benefits duration of entitled and non-entitled beneficiaries that control for a number of individual characteristics and time effects suggest that the average spell on benefits increased by 20-30 days for people entitled to the extension. On the contrary, we do not find significantly longer duration on benefits among younger beneficiaries only entitled to the higher replacement rate.
We then study how re-employment probabilities were affected by the more generous UI schedule. Our exercises do not detect lower re-employment probabilities for beneficiaries only entitled to a higher replacement rate. When we limit the analysis to before/after comparisons within beneficiaries we fail to find differences comparing beneficiaries in 2000 (before) with beneficiaries after (2001) the change; extending the sample to include earlier claims (pre-2000) in the control group even yields a surprising higher employment likelihood for beneficiaries paid a higher replacement rate. We are able to detect a lower re-employment probability only at longer horizons (beyond 180 days) when the sample includes also non-beneficiaries, which allows to control for common time effects. In such exercises, the probability of re-employment at horizons longer than 6 months turns out to be lower by about 10 percentage points for higher replacement rate beneficiaries, an effect implausibly large considered the limited amount of additional resources provided by the higher replacement rate. As regards the extension of the duration limit, we are able to detect some effect on the likelihood of re-employment, but these results become much smaller, around of 2-4 percentage points lower probability of reemployment at all horizons, and statistically non significant when we account for differences in the age profile of re-employment patterns.
As most of our exercises are based on comparisons of the relevant outcome variables over time for observationally similar individuals, results are potentially tainted by changes in the composition of benefits collectors,perhaps induced by the more generous system itself. We thus provide some descriptive evidence on the evolution of job-separation and take-up rates across the relevant discontinuities. While we find no evidence that the change in the benefits scheme was associated with changes in the separation rates, we unveil some mild evidence that takeup rates slightly increased. However, the underlying time series shows a marked cyclical pattern and the available data do not allow for a clearcut conclusion on the nature of such empirical
association. Yet, it raises concerns that pre-and post-reform beneficiaries may be different.
We provide evidence that, as concerns observable characteristics, this seems not to be the case, however.
Our reading of the results is that the changes in the main features of the ordinary unemployment benefits scheme had at best mild effects on the probability of re-employment. It is worth keeping in mind that: (a) our findings are local, in the sense that they refer to the specific sample and institutional change investigated; there is no guarantee that larger increases in replacement rates would not significantly affect labor supply. (b) The assumptions under which our estimates reflect causal effects are strong, especially as concerns the response to a higher replacement rate. (c) We only look at the first year the change was phased in; however, anecdotal evidence suggests that little information was available on the new regime so that the choices we observe could have been made assuming an unchanged benefits scheme; more data are thus needed for a broader assessment. as the only source of identification is time variation in re-employment patterns. (d) The limited sample size often leads to very imprecise estimates.
The aim of this preliminary investigation was to simply document, and possibly quantify, 24 the responses to a change to the unemployment benefits scheme. While we did not find much evidence of a behavioral response, it is worth emphasizing that in our framework detecting a response in line with theoretical predictions would have still left open an important question about the sources of such reaction. The main purpose of unemployment insurance schemes is to provide insurance against the event of job loss. Insurance is beneficial because it allows to smooth consumption across states and to improve welfare. However, because agents can manipulate their search behavior, providing insurance also distorts the relative price of leisure and consumption and reduces the incentives to work 17 . This substitution effect is generally claimed to be the reason why unemployment insurance programs tend to increase unemployment duration. This view neglects another important effect of social insurance programs, namely the fact that it relaxes liquidity constraints by providing income. This additional effect also leads to an increase of unemployment duration but only for individuals who cannot smooth consumption. The two channels through which unemployment insurance affects unemployment duration, the substitution and the liquidity effects, have opposite welfare effects. The first response is socially suboptimal as it is an individually optimal response to a distortion in relative prices; the second is a socially optimal response to failures in financial markets. Therefore, an assessment of the relative importance of these channels is crucial for the design of an efficient unemployment benefits scheme. In particular, from a public policy point of view, while such a system should attempt to minimize the distortions entailed by the substitution effect, it should carefully consider the beneficial effects it produces in the presence of imperfect credit markets by relaxing liquidity constraints and moving the individual decision towards the optimal unconstrained one.
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Figure 1: The evolution of replacement rates in Italy: ordinary unemployment benefits. 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Benefits Take-up is defined as an employment spell followed by a spell on benefits; the underlying population is employment spells followed by either spell on benefits (takeup) or in employment (no takeup). Figures report monthly and average yearly take-up rates. Table entries 2): area, initial week and sex dummies, sex-specific linear age term, log of tenure, average and last wage at the previous job; col. (3): area, initial week and sex dummies, sex-specific linear age term, log of tenure, average and last wage at the previous job, cubic in time (quarters), quarterly unemployment and GDP growth rates; col. (4): none; col. (5) year, initial week and sex dummies, sex-specific linear age term; col. (6)- (7): area, year, initial week and sex dummies, sex-specific linear age term, log of tenure, average and last wage at the previous job, quarterly unemployment and GDP growth rates; cols. (8)- (9): area, year, initial week and sex dummies, sex-specific linear age term, log of tenure, average and last wage at the previous job, quarterly unemployment and GDP growth rates. (2): area, initial week and sex dummies, sex-specific linear age term, log tenure, average and last wage at the previous job; col. (3): area, initial week and sex dummies, sex-specific linear age term, log tenure, average and last wage at the previous job, cubic in time (quarters); cols. (4)-(5): area, initial week and sex dummies, sex-specific linear age term, log tenure, average and last wage at the previous job, cubic in time (quarters), quarterly unemployment and GDP growth rates. Cols. (1)- (4) and one indicating being a beneficiary (C). All samples only include persons aged 20-48 at the beginning of the non-employment spell. Specs. 1: non-employment spells beginning in 1st semester of 2000-2001; no controls. Spec. 2: non-employment spells beginning in 1st semester of 2000-2001; area, initial week and sex dummies, sex-specific age effect, log of tenure, last wage and average wage at previous job. Spec. 3: non-employment spells beginning in 1st semester of 1997-2001; area, initial week and sex dummies, sexspecific age effect, log of tenure, last wage and average wage at previous job, a cubic in calendar time (quarters). Specs. 4: non-employment spells beginning in 1st semester of 2000-2001; claimant dummy. Spec. 5: non-employment spells beginning in 1st semester of 2000-2001; year, area, initial week sex and claimant dummies, sex-specific age effect, log of tenure, last wage and average wage at previous job. Spec. 6: non-employment spells beginning in 1st semester of 1997-2001; year, area, initial week sex and claimant dummies, sex-specific age effect, log of tenure, last wage and average wage at previous job. 
